UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

12-18-2013

State v. Goetsch Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41359

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"State v. Goetsch Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41359" (2013). Not Reported. 1618.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1618

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

NO. 41359
JEROME COUNTY NO. CR 2011-6654

)

JUSTIN SAMUEL GOETSCH,
Defendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF JEROME

HONORABLE JOHN K. BUTLER
District Judge

SARA B. THOMAS
State Appellate Public Defender
State of Idaho
I.S.B. #5867
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #9307
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, ID 83703
(208) 334-2712

ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................... 6
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................................7
I.

The District Court Violated Mr. Goetsch's Right To Due Process
By Increasing His Sentence Because He Exercised His
Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free Counsel At
Government Expense ........................................................................................... 7

II. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Considered, As
A Factor In Sentencing, Mr. Goetsch's Exercise Of His
Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free Counsel Which
Cost The County Additional Money ....................................................................... 9
Ill. In Light Of The Affidavit From Jenny Bateman That Directly
Addressed And Discredited A Factor That The District
Court Improperly Considered At Sentencing, The District
Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Goetsch's
Rule 35 Motion .................................................................................................... 11
IV. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified
Sentence Of 25 Years, With 15 Years Fixed, Following Mr. Goetsch's
Plea Of Guilty To Sexual Abuse Of A Child ........................................................ 13
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 18
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 19

Cases
Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989) ................................................................ 8
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) ............................................................... 8
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) ....................................................... 8
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940) ............................................................ 7
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) .......................................................... 7
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ...................................................................... 7
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) ..................................................... 8
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) ................................................................ 7
State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271 (Ct. App. 2000) ................................................. 14
State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784 (Ct. App. 2007) ...................................................... 7
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53 (2003) ................................................................ 7
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982) ...................................................................... 14
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 P.3d 961 (2010) ..................................................... 8
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982) .................................................. 14
State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527 (1993) ................................................................ 8
State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565 (Ct. App. 1982) .............................................. 9, 14
State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251 (Ct. App. 1994) .................................................... 11
Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87 (1991) ............. 9
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368 (1982) .................................................... 8

Rules
Rule 35 ...................................................................................................... 9, 11, 13

ii

Statutes
I.C. § 19-2521 ................................................................................................. 9, 10

Constitutional Provisions
Sixth Amendment ..................................................................................................?
Fourteenth Amendment ........................................................................................7

iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Justin Samuel Goetsch pleaded guilty to one
count of sexual abuse of a child. The district court imposed a unified sentence of 25
years, with 15 years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Goetsch asserts that: (1) the district court
violated his right to due process by punishing him for exercising his constitutional right
to conflict-free counsel at government expense; (2) the district court abused its
discretion when it imposed his sentence because it used, as a factor in sentencing, the
fact that appointment of conflict counsel cost the county additional money; (3) the
district court abused its discretion when it denied his Idaho Criminal Rule 35
(hereinafter, Rule 35) motion because there was new information presented that was
misinterpreted and not adequately considered; and (4) the district court abused its
discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On November 13, 2011, Jacob Bateman, the victim's brother, informed Jerome
police Officer Clayton that he had found a note written by the victim (hereinafter, R.M.)
that said Mr. Goetsch wanted to "get down her pants."

(Presentence Investigation

Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.8.) 1 Mr. Bateman also stated that the note said that R.M.
was concerned that if she reported the incident that prompted her to write the note,
Mr. Goetsch would rape her.

(PSI, p.8.)

Shortly thereafter, Officer Clayton went to

R.M.'s residence to speak with her and confirmed her date of birth as
meaning R.M. had just turned sixteen.

1

(PSI, p.8.)

Mr. Goetsch and R.M.'s

mother (Jenny Bateman), who was Mr. Goetsch's fiance, were also living at the
residence. (PSI. p.8.) R.M. admitted that she wrote the note after an incident that took
place over a year earlier. (PSI, p.8.) She told the officer that sometime between late
September 2010 and the end of October of 2010, she and Mr. Goetsch were watching a
movie together on a couch when Mr. Goetsch "began rubbing around her genitals."
(PSI, p.8.) She said that her mother walked in the room at th-at point, and Mr. Goetsch
stopped, but she was concerned that if her mother had not walked in the room,
Mr. Goetsch may have gone further. (PSI, p.8.) R.M. said she told her mother about
the incident and her mother confronted Mr. Goetsch about it. (PSI, p.8.) R.M. also said
no further incidents had occurred in the ensuing year. (PSI, p.8.)
When Officer Clayton contacted Mr. Goetsch, Mr. Goetsch admitted that he had
made a terrible mistake and touched R.M. in the genital area under her shorts. (PSI,
p.8.) Subsequently, Mr. Bateman gave Officer Clayton R.M's note and told him that he
had a recording of a conversation between himself and Jenny Bateman where she said
that she knew what had occurred and said it was wrong but felt that it was handled in a
way that was better than Mr. Goetsch going to prison. (PSI, p.8.)
Mr. Goetsch was arrested and charged with one count of lewd conduct with a
minor under sixteen years of age, felony, in violation of I.C. § 18-1508 and one count of
sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen years, felony, in violation of I.C. § 181506(1)(a) and/or (b).

(R., pp.87-90.)

Additionally, the State sought a persistent

violator enhancement based on the fact that Mr. Goetsch had once been convicted of
similar offenses. (R., pp.87-90.)

1

All page cites to the PSI and its exhibits refer to the 89-page electronic document
entitled "41359 State v. Goetsch Confidential Exhibits."
2

Initially, Mr. Goetsch considered going to trial and, apparently in one of his
meetings with his public defender (Stacey DePew), he discussed a potential trial
strategy with Ms. DePew that could have implicated one of Ms. Depew's former clients
in another crime; therefore, Ms. DePew moved to withdraw. Apparently because the
district court initially refused to let her withdraw,2 Ms. DePew filed an affidavit under seal
with the district court in support of her motion.

(PSI, pp.2-5.)

In that affidavit,

Ms. DePew went into detail about a previous discussion with Mr. Goetsch's family and
explained a potential trial strategy in some detail to the district court. (PSI, p.4.) She
explained that Mr. Goetsch's family had hired a private investigator and that the
investigator and Jenny Bateman had come to believe that R.M.'s allegations "were false
and stemmed not from the defendant's conduct, but rather the alleged rape of the
alleged victim by an individual who has been a client of counsel's .... " (PSI, p.2.)
Ms. Depew attempted to clarify this potential defense as follows:
The defense which is to be proffered to the Jury involves accusing
counsel's former client of rape of the alleged victim in the defendant's
above-entitled case. The defense is that the rape by the former client of
counsel is what caused the alleged victim in this case to make false
allegations against the defendant and that the defendant is not guilty of
lewd conduct.
(PSI, p.4.) Despite this detail, the potential defense strategy was not entirely clear. The
most logical interpretation, however, is that the strategy would focus on the fact that the
trauma from the rape affected R.M. in a way that caused her to falsely accuse
Mr. Goetsch of touching her and would potentially explain why she was fearful that
Mr. Goetsch would rape her if she told anyone about the touching.

2

Section 11 of Ms. Depew's affidavit suggests that the district court initially refused to
allow Ms. DePew to withdraw. It states "'[d]espite the court's impression that the conflict
merely involves questioning the character of the alleged victim through a prior client, the
conflict here is much deeper .... " (PSI, p.4.)
3

Once it became clear that there was a potential conflict, but apparently before
Mr. Goetsch made a final decision as to whether to go to trial on the scheduled date or
accept a plea offer, Ms. DePew thought it best to withdraw, and Mr. Goetsch agreed.
This would require a continuance, but Mr. Goetsch said he would be willing to waive his
rights to a speedy trial, and that he "would be more comfortable with a lawyer who did
not have a conflict of interest."

(PSI, p.5.)

Conflict counsel was appointed soon

thereafter. (R., p.64.)
Mr. Goetsch eventually chose not to go to trial and, instead, to accept a plea
agreement; he pleaded guilty to one count of sexual abuse of a child under the age of
sixteen years. (Tr. 4/9/12, p.19, Ls.12-17.) In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss
the other charges.

(Tr. 4/9/12, p.13, Ls.7-17.) At the sentencing hearing, the State

recommended a unified sentence of 25 years, with 10 years fixed. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.31,
Ls.22-25.) Mr. Goetsch's counsel requested that the district court retain jurisdiction so
that Mr. Goetsch could participate in sex offender treatment and then, upon his
successful completion of that treatment, take part in community-based treatment.
(Tr. 6/25/12, p.37, Ls.9-17.)
Based in part on the fact that Mr. Goetsch's crime "resulted in additional cost to
the county" because of the necessity to appoint conflict counsel, the district court
exceeded the State's recommendation and imposed a unified sentence of 25 years,
with 15 years fixed. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.10-13, R., p.112, Tr. 6/25/12, p.42, Ls.7-9.)
The district court said that it noted that "during the pendency of this action it was
necessary to appoint a conflict public defender because of assertions, either by you or
other family members, that perhaps there was another person who committed this
crime." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.4-9.)
4

Mr. Goetsch filed a timely Rule 35 motion based on new information in the form
of an affidavit from Jenny Bateman.

(R., pp.130-133.)

Her affidavit addressed the

district court's conclusion that there were assertions made that another person
committed the crime. (See R., pp.132-133.) Ms. Bateman said that at no point did she
"ever say or insinuate to Ms. DePew that this third person had committed the crime
against my daughter for which the defendant has pied guilty in this matter." (R., p.133.)
This obviously supported the conclusion that the district court misinterpreted the trial
strategy. Nevertheless, the motion was denied by the district court. (R., pp.135-137.)
In its order to that effect, the district court stated that "Ms. Bateman claims in her
affidavit that she never told or insinuated to Ms. DePew that this other man is the man
who actually committed the rape for which the defendant is accused."

(R., p.137.)

However, Mr. Goetsch was never accused of rape. Further, the district court went on to
incorrectly say that Ms. Bateman's statement was,
in direct conflict with the affidavit of counsel filed under seal in support of
her motion to withdraw as counsel for the defendant. When the court
granted the motion to withdraw it was clear that the defendant and the
family of the victim were claiming that the allegations of the victim as to
the defendant were false. The defendant requests that this Court grant
him leniency because he has presented information to evidence that he
did not attempt to blame a third party for his crime. Such a claim is not
supported by the record, sealed or otherwise that was the basis to allow
prior counsel to withdraw.
(R., p.137.)
In the meantime, Mr. Goetsch filed a notice of appeal that was timely from
the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.124-126.)

5

ISSUES

1.

Did the district court violate Mr. Goetsch's right to due process by increasing his
sentence because he exercised his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel at
government expense?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it considered, as a factor in
sentencing, Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his constitutional right to conflict-free
counsel which cost the county additional money?

3.

In light of the affidavit from Jenny Bateman that directly addressed and
discredited a factor that the district court considered at sentencing, did the district
court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 Motion?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of
25 years, with 15 years fixed, following Mr. Goetsch's plea of guilty to sexual
abuse of a child?

6

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Violated Mr. Goetsch's Right To Due Process By Increasing His
Sentence Because He Exercised His Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free Counsel At
Government Expense
Every defendant has a constitutional right to conflict-free counsel. ''The right to
conflict-free representation derives from the S.ixth Amendment as applied to the states
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." State v. Cook, 144 Idaho
784, 791 (Ct. App. 2007) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932); State v.
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60 (2003)).

And of course the United States Supreme Court

has stated emphatically that the right to representation applies to indigents and those
with means alike.
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and laws
have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive safeguards
designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal cannot be realized
if the poor man charged with crime has to face his accusers without a
lawyer to assist him.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).

Also, because Mr. Goetsch is an indigent defendant, the district court's
consideration of his exercise of his constitutional right to conflict-free counsel and the
resulting cost to the county also implicates equal protection issues.
Providing equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an
age old problem .... Both equal protection and due process emphasize
the central aim of our entire judicial system - all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, "stand on an equality before
the bar of justice in every American court."
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16-17 (1956) (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,

241 (1940)).

Further, a long line of United States Supreme Court cases make it clear that no
defendant can be punished for exercising a constitutional right. "[W]hile an individual
certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be
punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right." United States v.
Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982).

These cases also leave no doubt that such

punishment is a violation of due process. "To punish a person because he has done
what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort ..
. ." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); accord North Carolina v. Pearce,
395 U.S. 711 (1969), overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794
(1989); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).
Although none of these cases speak to Mr. Goetsch's exact situation because
they address prosecutorial or judicial vindictiveness, their broad admonitions certainly
apply here.

And the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the "right to be free from

vindictive sentencing" constitutes a fundamental error that can be reviewed for the first
time on appeal, "because it would go to the foundation or basis of [the defendant's]
rights." State v. Robbins, 123 Idaho 527, 530 (1993). Therefore, other violations of due
process at sentencing would constitute fundamental error, which can be considered on
appeal even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection.
The Robbins decision was prior to the Court's recent clarification of fundamental
error in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209 (2010). After Perry, this Court applies a three-part
test to determine whether an error is fundamental: (1) whether the alleged error violates
an unwaived constitutional right; (2) whether the error is plain and obvious from the
record, including information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;
and, (3) whether the defendant can establish that the error affected the outcome of the
8

proceedings. Id. at 226. Here, the district court's use of Mr. Goetsch's exercise of his
constitutional rights as an aggravating factor in sentencing satisfies this test.
First, Mr. Goetsch never waived his right to due process at his sentencing
hearing. Second, the error is clear and obvious from the record; the district court said
that it was considering the fact that it was necessary to appoint a conflict public
defender because of "assertions by you or other family members, that perhaps there
was another person who committed this crime," 3 and that the resultant cost to the
county of that appointment was a "a factor, but a very minor factor for the court to
consider." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.4-13.) And finally, whether it was minor or not, the
district court obviously considered it to be an aggravating factor that should have
increased Mr. Goetsch's sentence, and thus it affected the outcome of the proceedings.
Therefore, it was fundamental error.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Considered, As A Factor In
Sentencing, Mr. Goetsch's Exercise Of His Constitutional Right To Conflict-Free
Counsel Which Cost The County Additional Money
In reviewing an exercise of discretion, an appellate Court considers "(1) whether
the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial
court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal
standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho

Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (1991).

3

This appears to have been a misunderstanding of the potential trial strategy. Although
that misunderstanding is largely irrelevant for this issue, it is certainly relevant to the
Rule 35 discussion below.
9

The factors that a district court may consider at sentencing are well-established.
"[A] term of confinement is reasonable to the extent it appears necessary, at the time of
sentencing, to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given
case." State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). Additionally, district courts
may consider the criteria specified in I.C. § 19-2521, which codify the Toohi/1 factors in
large part and also illuminate potential mitigating factors. However, there is no case law
or statute that indicates that the district court may consider the cost of conflict-free
representation for an indigent defendant as an aggravating factor.

And this is also

clearly improper under Goodwin.
Here, at Mr. Goetsch's sentencing hearing, the district court referenced these
standard sentencing factors when it said that "protection of society is this court's primary
concern." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.39, Ls.8-9.) It went on to reference I.C. § 19-2521 and also
said that it considers "the character of the offender, the nature of the underlying offense,
as well as defendant's prior record." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.39, Ls.16-18.

However, it then

pointed out that "it was necessary to appoint a conflict public defender because of the
assertions, either by you or other family members, that perhaps there was another
person who committed this crime."

(Tr. 6/25/13, p.41, Ls.5-9.) This seems to be a

misunderstanding of the potential trial strategy that was submitted under seal in
Ms. DePew's affidavit. But much more importantly, the district court went on to say that,
due to the appointment of conflict counsel "the defense of this crime has resulted in
additional cost to the county. That is a factor, but a very minor factor for the court to
consider."

(Tr. 6/25/14, p.41, Ls.10-13.)

Whether it was a minor factor or not is

irrelevant. It should never have been considered at all.
10

The district court correctly perceived that Mr. Goetsch's sentencing was within
the trial court's discretion. However, considering this factor in any way when fashioning
an appropriate sentence punished Mr. Goetsch for exercising his constitutionally
guaranteed right to conflict-free counsel.

In other words, considering Mr. Goetsch's

exercise of his constitutional right and the resulting extra cost to the county as a factor
in sentencing was not within the outer boundaries of the district court's discretion and
was not a choice available to it. Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion.

111.
In Light Of The Affidavit From Jenny Bateman That Directly Addressed And Discredited
A Factor That The District Court Improperly Considered At Sentencing, The District
Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Goetsch's Rule 35 Motion
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which can be
granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 Idaho
251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994).

"The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested

leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable." Id. However, if the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant can later show that it is excessive in light of new information presented
with the motion for reduction. Id.
Here, Mr. Goetsch provided new information in the form of an affidavit from
Jenny

Bateman.

(R.,

pp.132-133.)

The

affidavit

directly

addressed

the

misunderstanding and resulting prejudice generated by the details and potential trial
strategy that Ms. DePew included in her affidavit, and the fact that the court relied on
that misunderstanding at sentencing as discussed above.

11

It is clear from the order denying the Rule 35 that the district court misinterpreted
the purpose of Ms. Bateman's affidavit because the district court was obviously under
the impression that the potential trial strategy involved a plan to have Mr. Goetsch claim
that someone else committed the crime of touching R.M.
interpretation of the statements in Ms. DePew's affidavit.

That is not a reasonable
And the district court's

confusion on this entire issue is borne out in a number of its statements.

First, the

district court stated in its order denying the motion that "Ms. Bateman claims in her
affidavit that she never told or insinuated to Ms. DePew that this other man is the man
who actually committed the rape for which the defendant is accused."

(R., p.137.)

Mr. Goetsch was never accused of rape.
This may have been a simple mistake on the part of the district court, but it
supports the conclusion that the district court failed to adequately consider the
relationship between the two affidavits. It also supports the conclusion that, either due
to a misreading or due to the somewhat ambiguous nature of Ms. DePew's language in
her affidavit, the district court failed to understand the nuance of the potential trial
strategy. However, as discussed above, this never should have been considered at
sentencing in the first place, and then Ms. Bateman's affidavit would never have been
necessary.
Mr. Goetsch never denied committing this crime. Indeed, he admitted to Officer
Clayton immediately that he touched R.M. Moreover, he never went to trial and denied
committing the crime. He certainly considered trying to deny it in his meetings with his
attorney, but this information should never have been used against him; considering
different approaches prior to making a final decision about going to trial or pleading is
obviously typical in any serious case. And here, it actually appears as though the trial

12

strategy was the idea of Ms. Bateman and her private investigator.

There is no

indication that Mr. Goetsch was pushing for this approach. The fact that he eventually
pied guilty supports this conclusion.
Moreover, it is apparent from the statements of Ms. DePew that even if he had
tried to deny that he committed the crime at trial, he would not have claimed someone
else committed it. He would have argued that the rape of R.M. by a different person
resulted in trauma that created mental issues for R.M., and that trauma caused her to
falsely accuse Mr. Goetsch of touching her or created a fear that she might be raped by
him if she reported the incident. Therefore, Ms. Bateman's affidavit was certainly not in
"direct conflict" with Ms. DePew's affidavit but actually showed that the sentence was
excessive. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 35.
Of course all of this could have been avoided if the district court had allowed
Ms. DePew to withdraw initially, or, in the alternative, allowed her to withdraw after she
submitted her affidavit under seal and then proceeded without further disclosure or
consideration of the content of the affidavit.

Instead, the district court used the

information under seal in sentencing and in its order on the Rule 35. Every client has a
right to consult with his attorney about his options prior to a final decision as to whether
to accept a plea offer or go to trial. But the district court seemed displeased with this
development, and this led to a violation of Mr. Goetsch's right to due process and an
abuse of discretion. All of these errors could have been remedied by the district court
with relief under Rule 35.

13

IV.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of 25
Years, With 15 Years Fixed, Following Mr. Goetsch's Plea Of Guilty To Sexual Abuse
Of A Child
Even if this Court finds that the district court's consideration of an improper
aggravating factor was not a due process violation or an abuse of discretion, the district
still abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Mr. Goetsch's unified

sentence of 25 years, with 15 years fixed, is excessive because it is not necessary to
achieve the goals of sentencing.

When there is a claim that the sentencing court

imposed an excessive sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent
examination of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke,
103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App. 1982). Here, there are multiple mitigating factors that
indicate that Mr. Goetsch's character was not adequately considered by the district
court.
Independent appellate sentencing examinations are based on an abuse of
discretion standard.

State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000). When a

sentence is unreasonable based on the facts of the case, it is an abuse of discretion.
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90 (1982).

Unless it appears that confinement was

necessary "to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any
or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given
case," a sentence is unreasonable.

State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App.

1982). Accordingly, if the sentence is excessive, "under any reasonable view of the
facts," because it is not necessary to achieve these goals, it is unreasonable and
therefore an abuse of discretion. Id.
14

There is a great deal of mitigating information that supports the conclusion that
Mr. Goetsch's sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. First of
all, Mr. Goetsch was sexually abused as a child. (See PSI, pp.58, 80.) Apparently his
sister, who was sixteen years old at the time, engaged in intercourse, on seven
separate occasions, with Mr. Goetsch when he was only eight years old. (PSI, p.80.)
This is mentioned only briefly in a sex offender risk assessment and evaluation
conducted in 2004 and then only as part of a chart detailing his sexual experiences in
the psychosexual evaluation performed in 2012. (PSI, pp.58, 80.) The chart indicates
that this behavior was "consensual." That is difficult to believe. But it is even more
disconcerting that neither psychosexual evaluator delved more deeply into this issue
during the evaluations.

Based on such cursory coverage of this issue, it is not

surprising that the district court did not give adequate consideration to this information.
Further, Mr. Goetsch has significant mental health issues that were not
adequately

considered.

He

deficit/hyperactivity disorder.

suffers

from

(PSI, p.54.)

depressive

disorder

and

attention-

He was originally diagnosed with this

disorder when he was 6 years old, and he was put on medication at that time. (PSI,
p.53; Tr. 6/25/12, p.34, Ls.1-3.) In his mental health evaluation, he said he has always
struggled with school and with paying attention because he is "always on the move."
(PSI, p.50, p.53.) Indeed, Mr. Goetsch's counsel noted that Mr. Goetsch, because of
financial reasons, was not on his medication when he committed the instant offense, or
when he violated his parole for his previous offense. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.34, Ls.7-11.) His
counsel stated that Mr. Goetsch had "a history of acting out and impulsivity, and when
he is not on his Ritalin, and that certainly was the fact surrounding his involvement in
this crime." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.34, Ls.12-15.)
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Additionally, Mr. Goetsch showed great remorse for this crime. When he was
confronted by Officer Clayton, he said he had made a "terrible mistake." (PSI, p.8.)
And, in speaking about the crime, he said "I have no excuse for my actions, I destroyed
my family and ruined the relationship that I had with a wonderful young lady I saw as my
daughter. I can still see and feel the lack of trust in her eyes and her actions every time
I think about it and can do nothing to change it. I was wrong and hurt everyone I loved."
(PSI, p.10.) This remorse was also evidenced by the fact that he lived with R.M. for
another year after the incident and never touched her again. (See PSI, pp.87-88.)
Mr. Goetsch also cooperated throughout the entire PSI process and told the truth
about what happened.

In the PSI, he said that he "rubbed her pelvic area adjacent to

her hip." (PSI, p.10.) Also, he told the psychosexual evaluator that he never touched
her vagina. (PSI, p.82.) He agreed to take a polygraph and passed that test when he
answered no when asked if he had ever touched R.M. on the breasts, if he had any
further sexual contact with her beyond the one incident, and if he had touched her
vagina.

(PSI, pp.87-88.)

Moreover, the psychosexual evaluator said he was

"forthcoming and engaged meaningfully in the evaluation process," and that "[h]e did not
at any time express attitudes that condone or excuse sexual offending," and "he has
accepted full responsibility for his behavior." (PSI, p.83.)
Another mitigating factor that the district court failed to adequately consider is the
fact that Mr. Goetsch's first sexual offense occurred when he was 18, and he was in a
long-term consensual relationship with a 14-year-old. From the PSI, it is evident that
this was a mutual and loving relationship. (See PSI, pp.58, 79.) Indeed, Mr. Goetsch
was actually living with the girl and her mother for a short period, and her mother
apparently approved of the relationship because the three of them had even spoken
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about a marriage between them when the victim in that case turned 16. (Tr. 6/25/12,
p.32, Ls.22-25 - p.33, Ls.1-4.)

Mr. Goetsch's counsel spoke to the nature of this

relationship at the sentencing hearing and said that such a case would not have been
prosecuted in the same way in this day and age. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.33, Ls.5-13.) In other
words, he would not have been convicted of lewd and lascivious conduct and sexual
abuse of a child. The district court never acknowledged the nature of this relationship
when it discussed Mr. Goetsch's first offense at sentencing; it simply said that this was
Mr. Goetsch's "second sex crime." (Tr. 6/25/12, p.41, Ls.14-15.)
Given all the mitigating information in this case, Mr. Goetsch's sentence is
excessive because it is not necessary to achieve the goals of sentencing outlined in
Toohi/1. If Mr. Goetsch was put on a rider, he could get the kind of effective treatment

he needs, and society would be protected because if he was not successful on his rider,
he would face a significant prison sentence.
deterrent.

This would also serve as a strong

Further, as Mr. Goetsch's counsel pointed out at the sentencing hearing,

Mr. Goetsch is not a predator. (Tr. 6/25/12, p.34, Ls.23-25 - p.35, Ls.1-3.) He made a
serious mistake, but he realized just how serious it was and never did anything further in
the following year. His polygraph results support this. (PSI, pp.87-88.) In other words,
it was not an ongoing problem that would support the idea that he posed a serious
danger to society.

A shorter fixed term or a rider would still ensure that there was

significant retribution for the crime. But most importantly, it would give Mr. Goetsch a
chance at meaningful rehabilitation and ensure that Mr. Goetsch is able to deal
effectively with his mental health issues and discover how those can be treated
effectively so something like this would never happen again.
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As it stands now, Mr. Goetsch will not have a chance to get out of prison until he
is 50 years old. This was a serious offense, but society would certainly be better-served
if Mr. Goetsch could get treatment and move on to become a productive citizen instead
of being a burden on society.

And certainly this offense did not call for a greater
Given the facts of this case, Mr. Goetsch's

sentence than the State recommended.

extended sentence was not necessary and was thei:efore unreasonable and an abuse
of discretion.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Goetsch respectfully requests that his case be remanded for a new
sentencing hearing in front of a different district court. Alternatively, he requests that
this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2013.
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REED P. ANDE1is N
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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